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ABSTRACT
The protability of fraud in online systems such as app markets
and social networks marks the failure of existing defense mecha-
nisms. In this paper, we propose FraudSys, a real-time fraud pre-
emption approach that imposes Bitcoin-inspired computational puz-
zles on the devices that post online system activities, such as re-
views and likes. We introduce and leverage several novel concepts
that include (i) stateless, veriable computational puzzles, that im-
pose minimal performance overhead, but enable the ecient veri-
cation of their authenticity, (ii) a real-time, graph based solution
to assign fraud scores to user activities, and (iii) mechanisms to
dynamically adjust puzzle diculty levels based on fraud scores
and the computational capabilities of devices. FraudSys does not
alter the experience of users in online systems, but delays fraudu-
lent actions and consumes signicant computational resources of
the fraudsters. Using real datasets from Google Play and Facebook,
we demonstrate the feasibility of FraudSys by showing that the de-
vices of honest users are minimally impacted, while fraudster con-
trolled devices receive daily computational penalties of up to 3,079
hours. In addition, we show that with FraudSys, fraud does not
pay o, as a user equipped with mining hardware (e.g., AntMiner
S7) will earn less than half through fraud than from honest Bitcoin
mining.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The social impact of online services built on information posted
by their users has also turned them into a lucrative medium for
fraudulently inuencing public opinion [8, 17, 21, 24]. The need to
aggressively promote disinformation has created a black market
for social network fraud, that includes fake opinions and reviews,
likes, followers and app installs [4–6, 18, 22, 23, 25]. For instance,
in § 3.1, we show that in fraud markets, a fake review can cost
between $0.5 and $3 and a fake social networking “like” can cost
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Figure 1: Timeline of daily penalties (in hours) assigned by
FraudSys to the Google Play activities of two fraudsters we
identied in Freelancer.com. FraudSys imposes daily penal-
ties of up to 1,247 hours to the fraudster at the top and 3,079
hours for the fraudster at the bottom. As a result, the fraud-
sters need to consume signicant computational resources,
while their fraud is signicantly delayed. This in turn re-
duces the number of payments they would receive, and im-
pacts their protability.
$2. The protability of fraud suggests that current solutions that
focus on fraud detection, are unable to control organized fraud.
In this paper we introduce the concept of fraud preemption sys-
tems, solutions deployed to defend online systems such as social
networks and app markets. Instead of reacting to fraud posted in
the past, fraud preemption systems seek to discourage fraudsters
from posting fraud in the rst place. We propose FraudSys, the rst
real-time fraud preemption system that reduces the protability
of fraud from the perspective of both crowdsourced fraud work-
ers and the people who hire them. FraudSys imposes computa-
tional penalties: the activity of a user (e.g., review, like) is posted
online only after his device solves a computational puzzle. Puz-
zles reduce the protability of fraud by (i) limiting the amount
of fraud per time unit that can be posted for any subject hosted
on the online system, and (ii) by consuming the computational re-
sources of fraudsters. For instance, Figure 1 shows the timelines of
daily penalties assigned by FraudSys to two fraudsters detected in
Google Play. Based only on the recorded activities, FraudSys fre-
quently assigned hundreds of hours of daily computational penal-
ties to a single fraudster.
Challenges. Implementing a fraud preemption system raises sev-
eral challenges. First, FraudSys needs to detect fraud in real-time,
whenever a user performs an online system activity. Once assigned,
a puzzle cannot be rescinded. This is in contrast to existing systems
(e.g., Yelp) that detect fraud retroactively and can update previous
decisions when new information surfaces. Second, FraudSys needs
to impose dicult puzzles on fraudsters, but minimally impact the
experience of honest users. This is made even more complex by the
fact that fraudsters can attempt to bypass detection and even ob-
scure their true ability to solve puzzles. Third, a stateful FraudSys
service that maintains state for millions of issued and active puz-
zles is expensive and vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Our Contributions. Through FraudSys, we introduce several in-
novative solutions. To address the rst challenge, we exploit ob-
servations of fraudulent behaviors gleaned from crowdsourcing
sites and online systems, to propose a real-time graph based al-
gorithm to infer an activity fraud score, the chance that a user
activity is fraudulent [§ 4.2]. More specically, we introduce fea-
tures that group fraudulent activities according to their human
creator: FraudSys identies densely connected components in the
co-review graph of the subject targeted by the user activity, each
presumably controlled by a dierent fraudster. It then quanties
the connectivity of the user account performing the action, to each
component, and uses the highest connectivity as features that may
indicate that the user account and the corresponding component
are controlled by the same fraudster. FraudSys then leverages su-
pervised learning algorithms trained on these features to infer the
activity fraud score.
To address the second challenge, we develop adaptive hashrate
inference techniques to detect the computational capabilities of
even adversarial controlled devices to solve puzzles [§ 4.3], and de-
vise mechanisms to convert fraud scores to appropriate temporal
penalty and puzzle diculty values [§ 4.3]. The puzzles assigned
by FraudSys do not alter the online experience of users, as they are
solved on their devices, in the background. However, the puzzles
(1) signicantly delay detected fraudulent activities, posted only
when the device returns the correct puzzle solutions and (2) con-
sume the computational resources of the fraudsters who control
the devices.
To address the third challenge, we propose the notion of stateless
computational puzzles, computational tasks that impose no storage
overhead on the fraud preemption system provider, but enable it
to eciently verify their authenticity and the correctness of their
solutions [§ 4.1]. Thus, the fraud preemption system can assign a
puzzle to a device from which an activity was performed on the
online system, without storing any state about this task. The de-
vice can return the results of the puzzle in 5 seconds or 1 day, and
the provider can verify that the task is authentic, and its results are
correct. This makes our approach resistant to DoS attacks that at-
tempt to exhaust the provider’s storage space for assigned puzzles.
We show that the computational penalty imposed by FraudSys
on a fraudulent activity is a function of the capabilities of the de-
vice from which it is performed, and the probability that the ac-
tivity is fraudulent. We introduce and prove upper bounds on the
protability of fraud and the amount of fraud that can be created
for a single subject, per time unit [§ 5] . We evaluate FraudSys on
23,028 fraudulent reviews (posted by 23 fraudsters from 2,664 user
accounts they control), and 1,061 honest reviews we collected from
Google Play, as well as 274,297 fake and 180,400 honest likes from
Facebook. Even with incomplete data, FraudSys imposes temporal
penalties that can be as high as 3,079 hours per day for a single
fraudster. We also show that fraud does not pay o. At today’s
fraud payout, a fraudster equipped with an AntMiner S7 (Bitcoin
mining hardware) will earn through fraud less than half the payout
of honest Bitcoin mining.
2 RELATED WORK
Computation Based Fraud Preemption. Dwork and Naor [12]
were the rst to propose the use of computation to prevent fraud, in
particular spam, where the sender of an e-mail needs to include the
solution to a “moderately hard function” computed over a function
of the e-mail. Juels and Brainard [15] proposed to use puzzles to
prevent denial of service attacks, while Borisov [11] introduced
puzzles that deter Sybils in peer-to-peer networks. In Borisov [11],
newly joined peers need to solve a puzzle to which all the other
peers have contributed.
FraudSys not only seeks to adapt computational puzzles to pre-
vent online system fraud, but also needs to solve the additional
challenges of building puzzles whose diculty is a function of the
probability that an activity is fraudulent, while handling heteroge-
neous user devices (e.g., ranging from smartphones to machines
that specialize in such puzzles).
Graph Based Fraud Detection. Graphs have been used exten-
sively to model relationships and detect fraudulent behaviors in
online systems. Ye and Akoglu [26] quantied the chance of a sub-
ject to be a spam campaign target, then clustered spammers on a
2-hop subgraph induced by the subjects with the highest chance
values. Lu et al. [16] proposed a belief propagation approach im-
plemented on a review-to-reviewer graph, that simultaneously de-
tects fake reviews and spammers (fraudsters).
Mukherjee et al. [19] proposed a suite of features to identify
reviewer groups, as users who review many subjects in common
but not much else, post their reviews within small time windows,
and are among the rst to review the subject. Hooi et al. [14] have
recently shown that fraudsters have evolved to hide their traces,
by adding spurious reviews to popular items. To identify “cam-
ouaged” fraud, Hooi et al. [14] introduced “suspiciousness” met-
rics that apply to bipartite user-to-item graphs, and developed a
greedy algorithm to nd the subgraph with the highest suspicious-
ness. Akoglu et al. [2] survey graph based online fraud detection.
[13] provide a survey of community detection methods, evaluation
scores and techniques for general networks.
Unlike previous work, FraudSys assigns fraud scores to indi-
vidual user activities in real time, thus uses only partial informa-
tion. To achieve this, FraudSys develops and leverages features
that quantify the connectivity of the user activity to other groups
of activities previously performed by other fraudsters on the same
subject. Further, FraudSys also imposes computation and temporal
penalties to discourage fraud creation.
3 SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
Figure 2 illustrates the threemain components of the systemmodel.
First, the online service (the service) hosts the system functionality,
and stores information about user accounts and featured subjects.
Subjects can be apps in stores like Google Play, or pages for busi-
nesses, accounts and stories in social networks like Facebook.
Figure 2: Systemmodel. Theuser performs actions on the on-
line service, from a device that can range from a smartphone
to a Bitcoin miner. The online service implements and posts
the activity only if and after the FraudSys service validates
it. The FraudSys functionality can be implemented by the
online service or by a third party provider.
Second, the users: they register with the service, record prole
information (e.g., name) and receive initial service credentials, in-
cluding a unique id. Users can access the online service from a va-
riety of devices. For this, they need to install a client (e.g., app) on
each device they use. The online service stores and maintains in-
formation about each device that the user has used, e.g., to provide
compatibility information on Google Play apps.
Users are encouraged to act on existing subjects. The activities
include posting reviews, comments, or likes, installingmobile apps,
etc. The online service associates statistics over the activities per-
formed for each supported subject. The statistics have a signicant
impact on the popularity and search rank of subjects [1, 7], thus
are targets of manipulation by fraudsters (see § 3.1).
The third component of the system model is the FraudSys ser-
vice, whose goal is to validate user activities. For increased exibil-
ity, Figure 2 shows FraudSys as an independent provider. However,
FraudSys can also be a component of the online service.
3.1 Adversary Model
We consider two types of adversaries – adversarial owners and
crowdsourced fraud workers.
Adversarial owners. Adversarial behaviors start with the subject
owners. Adversarial owners seek to fraudulently promote their
subjects (or demote competitor subjects) in order to bias the popu-
larity and public opinion of specic subjects. For instance, fraudu-
lent promotions seek to make subjects more protable [3, 17], in-
crease the “reachability” of malware (through more app installs),
and boost the impact of fake news.
Fraud workers (= fraudsters). We assume that adversarial own-
ers crowdsource this promotion task (also known as search rank
fraud) to fraud workers, or fraudsters. In this paper we focus on
two types of fraudulent activities: writing fake reviews in Google
Play and posting fake “Likes” in Facebook. We have studied fraud-
ster recruitment jobs in crowdsourcing sites and fraud posted in
Google Play and Facebook. This has allowed us to collect fraud data
(see § 6.1) and to identify several fraud behaviors: (i) more than
one fraudster can target the same subject; (ii) user accounts con-
trolled by a fraudster tend to have a signicant history of common
activities, i.e., performed on the same subjects; and (iii) accounts
controlled by dierent fraudsters tend to have few common past
activities.
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Figure 3: Price per review (minimum, average and maxi-
mum), for crowdsourcing sites that focus on app market
fraud. The sites oer “fraud packages” and even discounts
for bulk fake review purchases. A fake review costs between
$0.5-$3.
Fraud incentives. We assume that fraud workers are rational, mo-
tivated by nancial incentives. That is, given an original invest-
ment in expertise and equipment, a fraud worker seeks to maxi-
mize his revenue achieved per time unit. Figure 3 shows the min-
imum, average and maximum cost per fraudulent activity, as ad-
vertised by several crowdsourcing and fraud-as-a-service (FAAS)
sites: a fake review for an app is worth between $0.5-$3, while a
fake social networking “like” can cost $2. In contrast, an adversarial
owner may have both nancial incentives (e.g., increased market
share for his subject, thus revenue), and external incentives (e.g.,
malware or fake news distribution).
3.2 Fraud Preemption System Denition
We introduce the concept of fraud preemption systems, that seek to
restrict the protability of fraud for both fraudsters and the people
who hire the fraudsters (i.e., adversarial owners). Specically, let
Sys = (U,S,F , P) be a system that consists of nite sets of users
(U), subjects (S) and fraudsters (F ) that interact through a set
of procedures P . In the adversary model of § 3.1, we say that Sys
is a (p,a)-fraud preemption system if it satises the following two
conditions:
(1) Fraudster deterrence: The average payout per time unit
of any fraudster in F does not exceed p.
(2) Adversarial owner deterrence: The average number of
fraudulent activities allowed for any subject in S per time
unit does not exceed a.
In addition, a puzzle-based fraud preemption system needs to sat-
isfy the following requirements:
(1) Real-time fraud detection. Detect fraud at the time it is
created, with access to only limited information (i.e., no
knowledge of the future).
(2) Penalty accuracy. Impose dicult puzzles on fraudsters,
butminimally impact the online experience of honest users.
(3) Device heterogeneity. Both honest and fraudulent users
may register and use multiple devices to access the online
service. Malicious users may obfuscate the computational
capabilities of their devices.
(4) Minimize systemresource consumption. The high num-
ber of issued, active puzzles will consume the resources of
the FraudSys provider, and open it to DoS attacks.
Figure 4: FraudSys architecture. The Fraud Detectormodule
uses supervised learning to assign a fraud score to user activ-
ities. The Fraud2Penaltymodule converts the fraud score to
a time penalty. The Hashrate Inference module estimates the
computational capabilities of the user device. Finally, the
Puzzler module generates a puzzle that the device should
take approximately the time penalty to solve.
4 FRAUDSYS
We introduce FraudSys, a real-time fraud preemption system that
requires users to verify commitment through an imposed resource
consumption action for each activity they perform on the online
system. Specically, FraudSys requires the device from which the
activity was issued, to solve a computational puzzle. FraudSys con-
sists of the modules illustrated in Figure 4: The Fraud Detection
module takes as input a user activity and the current state of the
subject, and outputs a fraud score. The Fraud2Penalty module con-
verts the fraud score to a time penalty: the time that the user’s
device will need to spend working on a computational puzzle. The
Hashrate Inference module interacts with the user device in order
to learn its puzzle solving capabilities. Finally, the Puzzler mod-
ule uses the inferred device capabilities to generate a puzzle that
the device will take a time approximately equal to time penalty to
solve.
To address requirement #1, the Fraud Detection module exploits
the fraudulent behaviors described in § 3.1. It builds co-activity
graphs and extracts features that model the relationships between
the user performing the activity and other users that have earlier
performed similar activities for the same subject.
We address requirement #2 through a two-pronged approach.
First, the Fraud Detection and Fraud2Penalty modules ensure that
the diculty of a FraudSys puzzlewill be a function of the detected
probability of fraud: activities believed to be honest will be as-
signed trivial puzzles, while increasingly fraudulent activities will
be assigned increasingly dicult puzzles. Second, FraudSys does
not change the experience of the user on the online system: the
user writes the review or clicks on the like button, then contin-
ues browsing or quits the app. The assigned puzzle is solved in the
background by the device on which the activity was performed.
However, FraudSys delays the publication of the activity, until the
device produces the correct puzzle solution.
Notation Definition
U , D , S , A user, device, subject, activity
T time of puzzle issue
r activity fraud score
∆ puzzle diiculty
ηD hashrate of device D
Γ puzzle cookie
Π puzzle
tarдet puzzle target value
τ temporal penalty
q number of shares (puzzle solutions)
K secret key of FraudSys
Table 1: FraudSys symbol table.
To address requirement #3, the Hashrate Inference module es-
timates the hashrate of the device performing the activity, and
provides the tool to punish devices that cheat about their puzzle
solving capabilities. To solve requirement #4, the Puzzler module
generates puzzles that outsource the storage constraints from the
FraudSys service to the user devices that solve the puzzles. In the
following we detail each FraudSys module, starting with the cen-
tral puzzle creation module.
4.1 The Puzzler Module: Stateless Puzzles
Let U be a user that performs an activity A from a device D, on
a subject S hosted by the online service. Table 1 summarizes the
notations we use. The FraudSys service stores minimal state for
each registered user, and serializes his activities, see Figure 5: the
devices from which a user performs a sequence of activities on
the online service, are assigned one puzzle per activity, each with
its own timeout. The device needs to return the puzzle solutions
before the associated timeout. To implement this, for each user U ,
the FraudSys service stores the following entry:
U , [〈Di ,ηi 〉]i=1..d , timeout ,
where, for each of the i = 1..d devices registered by U , Di is the
device identier and ηi is its hashrate (puzzle solving capabilities
measure, see following), and timeout is the latest time by which
one of these devices needs to return puzzle solutions.
FraudSys builds on the computational puzzles of Bitcoin, see [20].
Let H 2(M) denote the double SHA-256 hash of a messageM . Then,
the FraudSys puzzle issued to device D consists of a tarдet value
and a xed string F . We detail F shortly. To solve the puzzle, D
needs to randomly choose 32 byte long nonce values until it nds
at least one that satises:
H 2(nonce | |F ) < tarдet (1)
That is, the double hash of thenonce concatenated with F , needs
to be smaller than the tarдet value, another 32 byte long value. A
smaller tarдet implies a harder puzzle. The largest tarдet accept-
able by the system is called tarдet_1, or target of diculty 1.
Bitcoin has two drawbacks. First, the current diculty of Bit-
coin puzzles requires computational capabilities that greatly ex-
ceed those of devices used to access online services. Second, Bit-
coin requires the network to maintain state about issued puzzles.
State storage exposes FraudSys to attacks, while not storing state
Figure 5: Puzzle serialization: a user can perform multiple
activities, but each receives a dierent puzzle with its own
timeout, authenticated through the cookie Γ.
can enable adversaries to lower the diculty of their assigned puz-
zles. To address these problems we (i) change the tarдet_1 di-
culty to allow trivial puzzles, and (ii) introduce puzzle cookies, spe-
cial values that authenticate puzzles with minimal FraudSys state,
see following.
Device hashrate andpuzzle diculty.We set the tarдet_1 value
to be a 32 byte long value with one zero at the beginning, e.g.,
2255 − 1. In addition, the hashrate ηD of a device D is a measure
that describes the ability of the device to solve puzzles. Since the
puzzles need to be solved in a brute force approach, the hashrate
is measured in hashes per second. A relevant concept is the no-
tion of diculty, denoted by ∆, a measure of how dicult it is to
solve a puzzle whose input values hash below a given target. Its
relationship to the above tarдet value is given by:
∆ =
tarдet_1
tarдet
=
2255 − 1
tarдet
(2)
Given ηD , we derive the time τ taken by D to solve a puzzle with
diculty ∆, as follows. First, the number of hashes smaller than
a given target is equal to the target. For instance, the number of
hashes smaller than tarдet_1 is 2255 − 1 . Then, the probability p
of nding an input that hashes to a value smaller than the target
is equal to the target divided by the total number of hashes (2256).
Furthermore, the expected number of hashes, E, before achieving
the target is given by 1/p. Thus:
E = ηD × τ =
2256
tarдet
=
2256
tarдet_1
×
tarдet_1
tarдet
≈ 2 × ∆
and conclude that
τ =
2 × ∆
ηD
(3)
For instance, the lowest puzzle diculty is 1, which occurs when
the tarдet has a prex of one zero and the device is expected to
generate 2 hashes before solving the puzzle. Similarly, the maxi-
mum diculty is (2255 − 1), for a tarдet = 1, when the device is
expected to perform 2
255−1
1 × 2 ≈ 2
256 hashes.
The FraudSys puzzle and cookies. To minimize the storage im-
posed on the FraudSys service (see above), we leverage the cookie
concept [10]. Algorithm 1 illustrates the puzzle creation, verica-
tion and computation components. The FraudSys service gener-
ates and stores a secret key K (line 2). When a userU performs an
activity A from a device D on a subject S of the online service, the
online service calls the BuildCookie function of the FraudSys ser-
vice (lines 3-11). BuildCookie retrieves the hashrate of the deviceD
from the record stored by FraudSys forU (line 4). It then computes
the fraud score associated to the activity (line 5) then converts it
to a time penalty τ (line 6). We describe this functionality in the
Algorithm 1 FraudSys puzzle creation, verication and
computation components.
1. Object FraudSysService
2. K: key;
3. Function BuildCookie(U , D , S , A, q)
4. ηD := getHashrate(U , D);
5. r := computeFraudScore(U , S, A);
6. τ := fraud2Penalty(r );
7. ∆ := ηD × τ /2q
8. oldT := getTimeout(U);
9. newT := oldT + τ ;
10. Γ := HMAC(K, U , D, S, newT , ∆, A);
11. setTimeout(U , newT );
12. return Γ, ∆, newT ;
13. Function VerifyPuzzle(U , D , S , A, t imeout , Γ, σ : share[q])
14. if (Γ != HMAC(K, U , D, S, A, t imeout, ∆) return -1;
15. tarдet := getTarget(∆);
16. for (i := 0; i < q; i++)
17. if (H 2(σ [i] | | Γ) > tarдet ) return -1;
18. waitUntil(t imeout ); post A;
19. τ ′ := Tc −T ;
20. if ((ηD := 2∆/τ ′) ≥ ηmin )
21. updateHashrate(U , D , ηD );
22. Object UserDevice
23. Function SolvePuzzle(Γ, ∆, t imeout , q)
24. tarдet := getTarget(∆);
25. σ := new share[q]; i := 0;
26. while (i < q) do
27. nonce := getRandom();
28. if (H 2(nonce | | Γ) < tarдet )
29. σ [i] := nonce ;
30. i := i+1;
31. return U , D, S, A, t imeout, Γ, σ ;
next subsections. BuildCookie then uses a modied Equation 3 to
compute the diculty ∆ that the puzzle should have (line 7). ∆ is
q times smaller than in Equation 3, as the puzzle solution consists
of q shares, see SolvePuzzle. BuildCookie gets the current timeout
oldT of U , and updates it to newT by adding the penalty τ to it
(lines 8-9). It then computes the puzzle cookie Γ,
Γ = HMACK (U ,D, S,A, timeout ,∆)
as a keyed HMAC [9] over the user and device id, subject, activity,
new timeout and puzzle diculty (lines 9-10). BuildCookie setsU ’s
timeout value to the updatednewT value (line 11), then returns the
following puzzle (line 12) to the online service that forwards it to
device D (see Figure 2):
Π = Γ, ∆, timeout .
The puzzle cookie ensures that an adversary that modies the puz-
zle’s diculty or timeout, will be detected: the adversary does not
know the key K , which is a secret of the FraudSys service. Puz-
zle cookies are unique with high probability, due to collision resis-
tance properties of the HMAC, whose input is non-repeating.
Figure 6: Visualization of the co-review graph of a fraudu-
lent Google Play app. The nodes represent user accounts;
edges connect nodes corresponding to accounts with com-
mon, past review activities. The nodes in each of the 2 clus-
ters correspond to accounts controlled by the same fraud-
ster.
Solving the puzzle. When the device D receives the puzzle, it
needs to solve it: search for q nonce values that satisfy the inequal-
ity H 2(nonce | | Γ) < tarдet , for a tarдet corresponding to the di-
culty ∆. Specically, D invokes the SolvePuzzle function (lines 23-
31), that needs to identify q shares, i.e., nonce values that satisfy
the puzzle. q is a system parameter. The function rst uses Equa-
tion 2 to retrieve the tarдet value corresponding to the diculty ∆
(line 24). Then, it generates random nonce values until it identies
q values that satisfy the puzzle condition (lines 25-30). SolvePuzzle
returns the identied shares (in the σ array), which are then sent
to the online service and forwarded to the FraudSys server, along
with the user, device and subject ids, activity, timeout and cookie
of the received puzzle (see line 12 and Figure 2).
Verication of puzzle correctness. Upon receiving these values,
the FraudSys server invokes the VerifyPuzzle function (lines 13-
21), to verify its correctness as follows: (1) Reconstruct the puzzle
cookie Γ based on the received values and the secret key K . Verify
that this cookie is equal to the received Γ value (line 14). This en-
sures that all values, including the timeout have not been altered
by an adversary; and (2) Verify that each of the q shares satisfy the
puzzle (lines 15-17). If these verications succeed, FraudSys waits
until timeout expires to conrm the user action A, for posting by
the online service (line 18). It then uses the time required by the
device to solve the puzzle, to re-evaluate the hashrate of the device
(lines 19-20). It updates the stored hashrate only if the new value
is above a minimally accepted hashrate value (lines 20-21).
4.2 The Fraud Detection Module
To assign a fraud score to a user activity in real-time, the fraud
detection module can only rely on the existing history of the user
and of the subject on which the activity is performed. We propose
an approach that builds on the co-activity graphs of subjects, where
nodes correspond to user accounts that performed activities on the
subject, and edges connect nodes whose user accounts have a his-
tory of activities that targeted the same subjects. Edge weights de-
note the size of that history. Figure 6 shows the co-review (where
Figure 7: Fraud detection illustration: temporal evolution
of the co-activity graph of a subject. The nodes represent
user accounts that have performed an activity on the sub-
ject. Edges connect accounts with common past activities.
As a new user account posts an activity, FraudSys assigns
the activity a fraud score (the r1..r4 values), based on its con-
nectivity to previous activities. Yellow nodes are considered
fraudulent (r > 0.5).
activities are reviews) graph of a fraudulent Google Play app, that
received fake reviews from 2 fraud workers. Each cluster is formed
by accounts controlled by one of the workers.
The fraud detection module leverages the adversary model nd-
ings (§ 3.1) that a fraudster-controlled user account that performs
a new activity on a subject, is likely to be well connected to the
co-activity graph of the subject, or at least one of its densely con-
nected sub-graphs. Figure 7 illustrates this approach: Let U be a
user account that performs an activity A for a subject S at time
T . Let G = (V ,E) be the co-activity graph of S before time T . Let
GT = (VT ,ET ) be the new co-activity graph of S , that also includes
U , i.e., VT = V ∪ U . Given U , S and G, FraudSys extracts the fol-
lowing features, that model the relationship of U with S :
• Connectivity features. The percentage of nodes inV to whom
U is connected. The average weight of the edges between U and
the nodes in V . The average weight of those edges divided by the
average weight of the edges in E. This feature will indicate if U
increases or decreases the overall connectivity of G. The number
of triangles inGT that haveU as a vertex. The average edge weight
of those triangles.
• Best t connectivity features. Since U may be controlled by
one of multiple fraudsters who target S ,U may be better connected
to the subgraph ofG controlled by that fraudster. Then, use aweighted
min-cut algorithm to partitionG into componentsG1, ..,Gk , such
that any node in a component is more densely connected to the
nodes in the same component than to the nodes in any of the
other components.G1, ..,Gk may contain user accounts controlled
by dierent fraudsters, see Figure 6. Identify the component Gb ,
b ∈ {1, ..k} to whichU is the most tightly connected (according to
the above connectivity features). Output the connectivity features
between U and Gb .
• Account based features. The number of activities previously
performed by U . The age ofU : the time between U ’s creation and
the time when activity A is performed on S . The expertise of U :
the number of actions of U for subjects similar to S . Similarity de-
pends on the online service, e.g., same category apps in Google
Play, pages with similar topics in Facebook.
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Figure 8: Comparison of functions to convert fraud scores
(x axis) to time penalties (y axis). The logistic function (red
dot-line) exhibits the required exponential increase.
The FraudDetectionmodule trains a probabilistic supervised learn-
ing algorithm on these features and uses the trained model to out-
put the probability that a given activity is fraudulent. We detail
the performance of various algorithms, over data that we collected
from Google Play and Facebook, in § 6.
Per-fraudster timeout. We exploit the ability of the fraud detec-
tion module to identify accounts controlled by the same fraudster,
to further restrict fraud. Specically, instead of storing a timeout
timestamp for each user account, FraudSys can store a single timeout
per detected fraudster. Thus, FraudSys will accumulate penalties in
a single, per-fraudster account. This facilitates Claim 2.
4.3 The Fraud2Penalty Module
Given the fraud score r of an activity of user U (output by the
Fraud Detection module), performed from a device D associated
with the account ofU (see the model section), the Puzzler module
generates a puzzle whose diculty is a function of both r and the
computational capability ofD. We now describe the Fraud2Penalty
module, that converts r into a time penalty. We have explored sev-
eral functions to convert the fraud score r of a user activity to a
time penalty. Letminh andmaxh, andminf andmax f , denote the
minimum and maximum times imposed on the device from which
an honest, respectively fraudulent activity is performed. Let thr
denote the threshold fraud score above which we start to consider
a user activity as being fraudulent. We propose a conversion func-
tion that increases linearly when r < thr , and exponentially when
r > thr . Specically, we propose a exible generalization of the lo-
gistic function (when r > thr ), where the parameter k is the growth
rate: 

maxh−minh
thr
r +minh 0 ≤ r ≤ thr
maxf
1+(
maxf −minf
minf
)e−k (r−thr )
thr ≤ r ≤ 1 (4)
We have compared this logistic increase function with other func-
tions, with the same linear increase in the honest region, but expo-
nential ((max f −minf ) e
r−e thr
e1−e thr
+minf ) and logarithmic ((minf −
max f )
loдr
loд(thr )
+max f ) increase in the fraudulent regions. Figure 8
compares the logistic, exponential and logarithmic functions. It
shows that unlike the exponential and logarithmic functions, the
logistic function exhibits the desired rapid increase for fraud prob-
ability values above the threshold value. In § 6 we detail parameter
values for the logistic conversion function,
4.4 The Hashrate Inference Module
New device registration. When a user registers a new device,
the device sends its specs to the online service that forwards them
to FraudSys. FraudSys leverages its list of proled devices (see Ta-
ble 2) to retrieve the hashrate of the proled device with the most
similar capabilities. FraudSys stores the new device along with this
initial hashrate estimate under the id of the user that registers it
(see the Puzzle module). Given this hashrate and the above time
penalty, FraudSys uses Equation 3 to compute an initial puzzle dif-
culty.
Hashrate correction. The initial hashrate estimate of FraudSys
may be incorrect. In addition, as discussed in the System Model,
the user may be adversarial, thus attempt to provide an inaccurate
view of the puzzle solving capabilities of his device. To address
these problems, FraudSys employs an adaptive hashrate correction
process. Specically, an adversary with a more capable device than
advertised (see e.g., Table 2) will solve the assigned puzzle faster.
The incentive for this is a shorter wait time for his activity to post
on the online service. If this occurs, FraudSys increases its device
hashrate estimate to reect the observed shorter time required by
the device to solve the puzzle (see Algorithm 1, lines 19-20).
5 FRAUDSYS PROPERTIES
Claim 1. A fraudster that performs a fraudulent activity with
fraud score r from a device with hashrate η, is expected to compute
η×maxf
1+(
maxf −minf
minf
)e−k (r−thr )
double hashes.
Proof. According to Equation 4, the time penalty assigned to
a fraudulent activity with score r is τ =
maxf
1+(
maxf −minf
minf )e
−k (r−thr )
.
Then, Equation 3 ensures that the number of expected hashes that
the device needs to perform to solve the puzzle of Equation 1 is
η × τ , which concludes the proof. 
Let f be the number of fraud workers in the system (i.e., f =
|F |), τ be the average temporal penalty assigned by FraudSys to
a fraudulent activity, and let p be the expected payout for a single
fraudulent activity. We introduce then the following claim:
Claim 2. FraudSys is a (p/τ , f /τ )-fraud preemption
system.
Proof. The best t connectivity features of the FraudDetection
module (see § 4.2) enable FraudSys to detect activities performed
from accounts controlled by the same fraudster. This, coupledwith
an extension of the timeout concept applied at the fraudster level
(see § 4.2) ensures a serialization of fraudster activities. Then, the
average number of fraudulent activities that a fraudster can post
per time unit in FraudSys is 1/τ . This implies that, per time unit,
the expected payout of a fraudster is p/τ , and a subject can be the
target of at most f /τ fraudulent activities. This, according to the
denition of § 3.2, completes the proof. 
5.1 Security Discussion and Limitations
The FraudSys puzzle not only ties the penalty computation to the
user activity, but also addresses pre-computation, replay and guess-
ing attacks: the adversary cannot predict the cookie value of its
actions, thus cannot pre-compute puzzles and cannot reuse old
cookies. It also ooads signicant work from the FraudSys service,
which no longer needs to keep track of puzzle assignments.
Device deception. An adversary with a specialized puzzle solv-
ing device (e.g., AntMiner) will be assigned puzzles with large dif-
culty values (see, e.g., Table 2), thus consume the same amount
of time as when using a resource constrained device (e.g., a smart-
phone). The adversary can exploit this observation to avoid the
implications of Claim 1: register a resource constrained device, but
rely on a powerful back-end device to solve the assigned puzzles
faster. The adversary has two options. First, report the solutions
as soon as the back-end device retrieves them. In this case how-
ever, the adversary leaks his true capabilities, as FraudSys will up-
date the adversary hashrate (Algorithm 1, line 20). Thus, subse-
quently, his assigned puzzles will have a signicantly higher di-
culty value. In a second strategy, the adversary estimates the time
that his front-end device would take to complete the puzzle, then
waits the remaining penalty time. In this case, the adversary incurs
two penalties, the long wait time and the underutilized back-end
device investment.
Adversary strategies: new user accounts. To avoid the implica-
tions of Claim 2, the adversary registers new user accounts. While
new accounts are cheap, their freshness and lack of history will en-
able the account based features of the Fraud Detection module to
label them as being likely fraudulent. As the adversary reuses such
accounts, the connectivity features start to play a more important
role in labeling their activities as fraudulent. Thus, the adversary
has a small usable window of small penalties for new accounts.
While new honest accounts may also be assigned larger penal-
ties for their rst few activities, they will not aect the user experi-
ence: the user can continue her online activities, while her device
solves the assigned puzzle in the background.
6 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
6.1 Datasets
We have collected the following datasets of fraudulent and honest
behaviors from Google Play and Facebook.
Google Play: fraud behavior data. We have identied 23 work-
ers in Freelancer, Fiverr and Upwork, with proven expertise on
performing fraud on Google Play apps. We have contacted these
workers and collected the ids of 2,664 Google Play accounts con-
trolled by them. We have also collected 640 apps heavily reviewed
from those accounts, with between 7 and 3,889 reviews, of which
between 2% and 100% (median of 50%) were written from accounts
controlled by theworkers. These apps formour gold standard fraud
app dataset. We have also collected the 23,028 fake reviews written
from the 2,664 fraudster controlled accounts for the 640 apps. Fig-
ure 6 shows the co-review graph of one of these apps, that received
fake reviews from 2 of the identied 23 workers.
Device Hashrate Di (5s) (12hr) (7 day)
Nexus 4 6.53 KH/s 16.32K 141.04M 1.97G
Nexus 5 13.26 KH/s 33.15K 286.41M 4.00G
LG Leon LTE 10.1 KH/s 25.25K 218.16M 3.05G
NVS 295 1.7MH/s 4.25M 36.72G 514.08G
Server 80 MH/s 200M 1.72T 24.19T
AntMiner 4.72 TH/s 11.8T 101.95P 1427P
Table 2: Hashrate proling table for various device types
(smartphone, tablet, PC and Bitcoin miner), along with di-
culty values for penalty times of 5s, 12 hours and 7 days.
Google Play: honest behavior data. We have selected 925 can-
didate apps that have been developed by Google designated “top
developers”. We have removed the apps whose apks (executables)
were agged as malware by VirusTotal. We have manually inves-
tigated 601 of the remaining apps, and selected a set of 200 apps
that (i) have more than 10 reviews and (ii) were developed by rep-
utable media outlets (e.g., NBC, PBS) or have an associated busi-
ness model (e.g., tness trackers). We call these the gold standard
benign app dataset.
We have identied 600 reviewers of these 200 benign apps and
140 reviewers of the 640 fraud apps (see above), such that each has
reviewed at least 10 paid apps, i.e., paid to install the app, then re-
viewed it, and had at least 5 posts on their associated Google Plus
(social network) accounts. These 740 user accounts form our gold
standard honest user dataset. We have then retrieved and manually
vetted 854 reviews written by the 600 honest reviewers for the 200
benign apps, and 207 reviews written by the 140 honest reviewers
of the 640 fraud apps. Each selected review is informative, contain-
ing both positive and negative sentiment statements. We call the
resulting dataset, the honest review dataset, with 1,061 reviews.
Facebook Like dataset. We have used a subset of the dataset
from [8], consisting of 15,694 Facebook pages, that each has re-
ceived at least 30 likes. The pages were liked from 13,147 user ac-
counts, of which 6,895 are fraudster controlled, and 6,252 are hon-
est. In total, these fraudsters have posted 274,297 fake likes, and
the honest accounts have posted 180,400 honest likes.
6.2 Device Hashrate Prole
Strategy FPR% FNR% Accuracy%
k-NN 1.41 4.45 97.92
SVM 5.8 11.3 92.40
Random Forest 3.44 6.46 95.69
Table 3: 10-fold cross validation results of supervised learn-
ing algorithms in fraud vs. honest Google Play review clas-
sication. k-NN achieves the lowest FPR and FNR.
We have proled the hashrate of several devices, ranging from
smartphones to a Bitcoin mining hardware (AntMiner S7: ARMv7
CPU, 254Mb of RAM, 135 BM1385 chips @ 700MHz). Since Bitcoin
mining requires capabilities far exceeding those of smartphones,
we have implemented an Android app to evaluate the hashrate of
several Android devices. Table 2 shows the hashrate values for the
proled devices, along with the corresponding diculty (∆) val-
ues for puzzles required to impose 5 second, 12 hour and 7 day
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Figure 9: Stats over the Google Play data whenmax f = 24h, minh = 2s,maxh = minf = 5min. (a) Evolution of average, 1st and
3rd quartile of the penalty imposed on the i-th fraud activity of a fraudster for the same subject. It shows a steep increase: the
average penalty of the rst three fraud activities for a subject sums to 15.34h, while the average penalty of the 12th activity
exceeds 24h. (b) Distribution of per-fraudster daily penalties, over data from 23 fraudsters: in 1,812 days out of 2,708 days, the
penalty assigned to a single fraudster exceeds 24 hours. (c) Distribution of penalties assigned to an honest review. Only 14 out
of 4,600 honest review instances received a penalty exceeding 5 minutes, but still below 1 hour.
time penalties on such devices. We observe the signicant gap be-
tween the hashrate of a smartphone (10-15 KH/s) and a specialized
device (4.72 TH/s). This motivates the need for the puzzles issued
by FraudSys to have dierent ∆ values for various user devices.
FraudSys maintains a similar table in order to be able to build ap-
propriate puzzles for newly registered devices.
6.3 Fraud Penalty Evaluation: Google Play
Supervised learning algorithm choice. We rst used 10 fold
cross-validation to evaluate the ability of the Fraud Detection mod-
ule to correctly classify the 23,028 fraudulent vs. 1,061 honest re-
views of theGoogle Play dataset previously described. Table 3 shows
the false positive (FPR) and negative (FNR) rates, as well as the ac-
curacy achieved by the top 3 performing supervised algorithms. k-
NN has the lowest FPR and FNR, for an accuracy of 97.92%. Thus,
in the following experiments we use only k-NN.
Parameter evaluation. We have used the fraud and honest re-
view datasets described earlier, to compute the temporal penalties
imposed by FraudSys on fraudsters and honest users. We have per-
formed the following experiments. In each experiment, we use the
data of 22 fraud workers and 200 randomly chosen honest reviews
(out of 1,061) to train the supervised learning algorithm (k-NN)
then test the model on the data of the remaining fraud worker and
on the remaining 861 honest reviews. Thus, we have performed 23
experiments, one for each worker.
We set themax f parameter such that the average daily payout
of a fraudster is below the average Bitcoin mining payout with a
last generation AntMiner device. Thus, this ensures that even such
a powerful adversary has more incentive to do Bitcoin mining in-
stead of search rank fraud. Specically, the above AntMiner’s cur-
rent (Jan. 2017) average daily payout is 0.0037 BTC. At the current
BTC to USD rate, this means $3.67 per day 1. In addition, we have
experimented withmax f values ranging from 12 to 48 hours. The
average penalty assigned by FraudSys to a fraudulent review is
8.01 hours whenmax f =12h, 15.34h whenmax f =24h, and 29.33h
1Historically speaking, the BTC to USD rate is increasing. The next generation
AntMiner coming up this year is expected to be 3 times more capable.
whenmax f =48h. Figure 9a shows the median, rst and third quar-
tiles for the time penalty (in hours) imposed on the i-th fraudulent
activity performed by a fraudster for a subject, whenmax f = 24h:
the 12th fake activity receives a median penalty of 24h.
Thus, we setmax f =24h, which is sucient for Google Play re-
views: A fraudster would be able to post on average less than 2 fake
reviews per day, thus, even with a reward of $2 per fraud activity
(see Figure 3), achieve a payout of around $3.15 per day, below the
Bitcoin mining payout. In addition, we have set minh = 2s. Fig-
ure 1 shows the penalty timelines of two workers whenminh = 2s,
maxh =minf = 5 min,max f = 24 hours, thr = 0.5, and k = 30 (for
a steep increase of time penalty with fraud score). We note that a
maxh = 5 min is not excessive: this penalty is not imposed on the
user, but on his device. The user experience remains the same in
the online service.
Each vertical bar shows the daily temporal penalty assigned to
a single worker, over reviews posted from multiple accounts. The
maximumdaily penalty of the twoworkers is 1,247 hours and 3,079
hours respectively. We observe that each worker has many days
with a daily penalty exceeding 24 hours.
Figure 9b shows formaxh = minf = 5min, the overall distribu-
tion of daily penalties assigned by FraudSys, over all the 23 fraud
workers, in the above experiment. It shows that during most of
the active days, fraud workers are assigned a daily penalty exceed-
ing 24 hours. Figure 9c (also formaxh = minf = 5min) shows the
distribution of per-review penalty assigned by FraudSys to honest
reviews, shown over 4,600 (23 × 200) honest reviews. Irrespective
of themaxh value, only 14 honest reviews were classied as fraud-
ulent, but assigned a penalty below 1 hour. We observed minimal
changes in the distribution of penalties of fraudulent reviews when
maxh =minf ranges from 5 to 15 minutes.
6.4 Fraud Penalty Evaluation: Facebook
We have performed a similar parameter analysis using the Face-
book “like” dataset. Since this dataset lacks information about the
fraudsters who control the accounts that posted fake likes, we fo-
cus on the penalties assigned by FraudSys to fake and honest likes.
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Figure 10: (a) Penalty distribution for the fake Facebook likes. 84% of the likes received a penalty that exceeds 12 hours, and
the average fake like penalty is 19.32 hours. (b) Penalty distribution for the honest Facebook likes. 82.97% of the honest likes
are assigned a penalty of under 5min. Themaximumpenalty assigned to an honest like is 70 minutes. (c) Comparison of daily
payouts provided by Bitcoin mining, writing fake reviews in Google Play and posting fake likes in Facebook, under FraudSys.
Fraud does not pay o under FraudSys: the fraud payout is less than half the Bitcoin mining payout.
Figure 10a shows the distribution of penalties assigned to fake
likes and Figure 10b shows the distribution of the honest likes.
Compared to the results over the Google Play data, we observe
a higher FPR, i.e., more honest likes with fraud level penalties. We
posit that this is due to the fewer features that we can extract for
the Facebook likes, as, unlike for Google Play reviews, we lack the
time of the activity. Specically, absence of like sequence informa-
tion enables us to only extract features based on the last “snapshot”
of the page, and not the current page snapshot when the like was
posted.
However, 82.97% of the honest likes receive a penalty of under
5 mins and the maximum penalty assigned to an honest review
is 70 mins. In addition, 84% of the fake likes receive a penalty
that exceeds 12 hours, and the average penalty for a fake like is
19.32 hours. Figure 10c compares the daily payouts received by an
AntMiner equipped fraudster who writes fake reviews in Google
Play (at $1 per fake review), posts fake likes (at $2 per fake like),
or honestly uses his device to mine Bitcoins. It shows that under
FraudSys, fraud doesn’t pay o: the Bitcoin mining payout is more
than double the fraud payout for either fake reviews or likes.
7 CONCLUSION
We have introduced the concept of real-time fraud preemption sys-
tems, named as the FraudSys, that seek to restrict the protability
and impact of fraud in online systems. We propose and develop
stateless, veriable computational puzzles, that impose minimal
overheads, but enable their ecient verication. We have devel-
oped a graph based, real-time algorithm to assign fraud scores to
user activities and mechanisms to convert scores to puzzle di-
culty values. We used data collected from Google Play and Face-
book to show that our solutions impose signicant penalties on
fraudsters, and make fraud less productive than Bitcoin mining.
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